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CANALs-BRI1JGES-DULTY TO REPAIR AND MAINTAIN.-In 1843 the defendant was chartered as a canal corporation by a special Act of Parliament. Section 62 of the Act required the company "at all times during the continuance
of the Act to maintain and keep . . . all bridges . . . and retaining
walls . . . in good and substantial and serviceable repair and in an effi-

cient state for all purposes thereof and of the traffic on the same respectively." The defendant company had kept the bridge in question in a
state suitable for traffic conditions of 1843, but denied any obligation to maintain the bridge in a condition necessary to modern traffic conditions. Held:
That under section 62 the defendant is not required to do so. Attorney General v. Layan Nazgation Co., [1924] A. C. 877.
Even without any express provisions in their charters, canal companies
have a common law duty to construct and keep in repair bridges for the use
of all public roads which the canal crosses. King v. County of Kent, 13
East 220 (Eng. 1811); King v. Kerrison, 3 M. & S. 526 (Eng. 1815); Re
Trenton Water Co., 20 N. J. L. 659 (1846) ; Franklin County v. White Canal
Co., 2 Ca-t. 162 (Ind. 185o); Burton Township v. Tuttle, 3o Ohio St. 62
(1876). It has also been held that this duty extended to private roads.
State v. Savannah Canal Co., 26 Ga. 665 (1859). But unless expressly required by its charter, the canal company does not have to bridge ways laid
out after the canal is constructed. Delaware Canal Co. v. Miffin, i Yeates
There
430 (Pa. 1795); Morris Canal Co. v. State, 24 N. J. L. 62 (1853).
qre no decisions based on a common law rule that decide the exact question
of the instant case. In America the closest case in point is a Pennsylvania
decision that where a road becomes a state highway subsequent to the construction of the canal, the company is not obliged to keep up the bridge
thereafter, since the expected increase in traffic would impose an unfair burden on it. Union Canal Co. v. Pineyrove.Township, 6 Watts & S. 56o (Pa.
1844). A canal company, however, was held not relieved of its obligation to
maintain a bridge which a railroad company had been permitted by the state
to alter so considerably as to increase immensely the cost of maintenance.
Amnermnan v. ll'yonzing Canal Co., 40 Pa. 256 (i86i). The distinction seems
to lie in the fact that the railroad company would have to reimburse the canal
company. And see Book v. Penna. R. R. Co.,207 Pa. 138, 56 AtI. 352 (1903).
The underlying principle of the early English cases cited above seems broad
enough to support the proposition that the bridge must be kept in condition
for present-day traffic. And there is a dictum to this effect by Fletcher Moulton, L. J., in County Council v. Great Eastern Ry. Co., [igo9] 2 K. B. 403, 412.
In the principal case it was urged, and with some reason, that section 62 is;
merely a statement of the English common law rule and that Therefore it
should be interpreted as such. But it seems settled that such provisions,
whether or not they are intended to be only statements of the common law
duty, must be construed without regard to the common law, whatever that
may be. Sharpess New Docks, etc., Co. v. Attorney General, [1915] A. C.
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654. Even so, the construction of section 62 is doubtful. Much stress is laid
upon the words "maintain and keep in repair," which the court says could
not mean "rebuild" and "reconstruct," as might be necessary if the bridge
was to be suitable for modern traffic conditions. This is construing the statute
on very narrow grounds. The court would be equally justified in construing the section by picking out the clause "in an efficient state for all purposes," which standing alone would lead to a result opposite to the one
reached. A broader interpretation is found in State v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co.,
89 N. J. L. 48, 97 Atl. 786 (i9i6), in which a requirement under a chartering
act to build and maintain bridges was held not to be limited by the necessities of travel at the time of chartering, but to cover modern traffic conditions.
And this would seem to be the better view. When the act or charter does
not specifically relieve the canal company, which is the beneficiary of a
valuable grant, it should be so construed as to give the most possible protection to the public.
CARRIERS-FAILURE

TO

FURNISH

CARs-AMERICAN

RAILWAY

AssOCIA-

TIo.-The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages resulting from failure
to furnish cars upon proper notice. The defendant offered as a defense,
proof that the American Railway Association, employed by it and other interstate carriers to look after the interchange and prompt return to the ownercarrier of freight cars engaged in int:rstate commerce, had failed to return
to it a sufficient number of its cars to supply plaintiff. The defendant did not
show, however, that the failure of the Association was due solely to some
emergency. Held: That the plaintiff may recover. McCord v. Louisville &
Nashville R. R. Co., 267 S. W. 766 (Ky. 1924).
While the duty of a railroad to furnish cars, is not absolute; Peet v.
Chic. & N. W. Ry. Co., 2o Wis. 594 (x866); Wallace v. Pecos, etc., R. Co.,
50 Tex. Civ. App. 296, iio S. W. 162 (19o7); Mulberry Hill Coal Co. v. Ill.
Cent. R. Co., i61 Ill. App. 272 (19i); performance will not be excused by
showing merely that its cars are unavailable because they are being used
elsewhere on other lines. It is the normal situation with an interstate carrier to have a number of its cars on other lines, and to afford a valid excuse
it must show that an unusual number are detained through some emergency.
Tex., etc., R. Co. v. Barrow, 94 S. W. 176 (Tex. Civ. App. i9o6); St.
Louis S. TV. R. Co. v. Phoenix Cotton Oil Co., 88 Ark. 594, I5 S. W. 393
(xgog) ; Pa. R. Co. v. Soninan Shaft Coal Co., 2 U. S. i2o (ipiS).
The obligation to furnish cars to the plaintiff, being owed by the Railroad, cannot be shifted to the Association. If the Association is merely the
defendant's agent, the defendant is clearly responsible. And, though the
Association has an independent status, the defendant should still be liable.
A railroad cannot escape liability for damage to freight by showing merely
that the injury was caused by defective cars supplied to it under contract by
another company. N. Y., Phila. & Norf. R. Co. v. Cromwell, 98 Va. 227,
S.A Louis Iron Mt. & So. Ry. Co. v. Renfroe, 8z Ar.
35 S. E. 444 (9oo)
143, 1oo S. W. 889 (i9o7) ; nor for injury to a passenger caused by a defective
berth in a Pullman car supplied by a Pullman Company. Pa. Co. v. Roy, 1o2
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U. S. 451 (i&8o). It has further been held that a railroad cannot escape liability for failure to furnish cars, where, having no cars at all of its own,
it was entirely dependent upon another company to furnish them. Mo. &
N. A. R. Co. v. Sneed, 85 Ark. 293, io7 S. W. 1182 (i9o8); and in a case
very similar to the instant one it was held that it was no excuse to show that
an association, of which the defenadnt was a member and whose duty it
was to do so, had failed to return the defendant's cars promptly enough to
enable the plaintiff to be served. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Slate, 85 Ark. 311,
107 S. W. 1180 (1907).
It is submitted that the view taken by the Kentucky Court, although,
upon the facts, quite new, is nevertheless in accord with general principles
laid down in the cases.
CEMFTEREs-DFDicATIoN-ABA.NDO'MENT.-The defendant purchased land
without knowledge that it was formerly the burial ground of the plaintiff's
family. No interments had been made for over -twenty years and all signs
that it was a cemetery had disappeared. The plaintiff brings trespass against
the defendant for excavating on the land. Held: That this did not constitute
such abandonment as would cause the fee to revert to the grantor. Frost
v. Columbia Clay Co., j24 S. E. 767 (S. C. 1924).
Land may be dedicated for burial purposes; Wormley v. Worntey, 207 Ill.
411, 69 N. E. 865 (i9o4) ; the fee remains in the grantor and the beneficiaries
under the dedication acquire only an easement to bury their dead on the land.
Therefore, upon abandonment of the cemetery by the public or the beneficaries
the fee reverts, unincumbered, to the grantor. Hins v. State, z7 Tenn. j,
149 S. W. 1058 (1911); Badcaux v. Ryerson, 213 Mich. 642, 182 N. W. 22

(1921).

The question then resolves itself into what constitutes an abandonment
of a cemetery. The use of a cemetery is two-fold-for the purpose of continuous burials, and for the purpose of preserving the remains and memory
of those who have been buried. Campbell v. City of Kansas, io2 Mo. 326,
13 S. V. 897 (i89o). Thus, the mere fact that interments have been discontinued will not be an abandonment, since the relatives of the dead still
have the right to protect the graves from desecration. Hunter v. The
Trustees of Sandy Hill, 6 Hill 407 (N. Y. 1844); VanBuskirk v. Standard
Oil Co., 94 N. J. Eq. 686, 121 At. 45o (1923). From this, it would follow
that a cemetery does not lose its character as such until those bodies already
interred are exhumed and removed; Kansas City v. Scarritt, i69 Mo. 484, 69
S. W. 283 (1902); but after disinterment, the cemetery purpose has ceased,
and the land is regarded as having lost its sacredness as a resting place for
the dead. Clarke v. Keating, 17o N. Y. Supp. 187 (i9i8).
The right to provide for the establishment and discontinuance of cemeteries is within the control of the legislature, which right it -may exercise
directly or intrust to local municipal action. Whenever there is a public
necessity for the discontinuance of a cemetery, the municipality may, with
proper care and attention, and at its own expense, remove the remains from
the discontinued cemetery to a suitable burial ground. Page v. Symonds, 63
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N. H. i7 (1883). The only right that lot owners can claim in such case is
to have notice and an opportunity to remove the bodies and monuments, and
upon their failure to do so, these may be removed by the city. Kincaid's
Appeal, 66 Pa. 411 (187o). And if the city removes the remains in a decent and orderly fashion to a suitable location from a buria! ground which
some
has been lawfully abandoned, a court of equity will not interfere unless
(1871;
1
Mass.
iog
Church,
substantial right is invaded. Sohicr v. Trinity
Kincaid's Appeal, supra.
In the instant case, where all signs that the bodies were in the land had
since disappeared and no relative had visited the forgotten graves for many
years, it is interesting to note to what length the courts will go in preserving
the sanctity of the resting place of the dead.
CONSTITUTIONAL
GUILT.-A statute in

LAw-DuE

PROCESs-ASCERTAINABLE

STANDARD

OF

New York made guilty of a misdemeanor any person
who with intent to defraud, sold or exposed for sale any meat or meat
preparation and falsely represented the same to be kosher. The appellants
challenged the constitutionality of this law as being in contravention of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States, claiming that the word '"kosher" was so indefinite ard uncertain as not to provide an ascertainable standard of guilt. Held: The
statutc was constitutional. Hygrade Provision Co., et at., v. Thermn, et al.,

45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141 (xgs).
It is clear that a criminal statute which is not sufficiently definite on its
face to enable a defendant to know what is forbidden violates the due
process clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. U. S.v. Cohen Co..
255 U. S. 81 (1921) (under Fifth Amendment). InternationalHarvester Co.
v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216 (1914) - (under Fourteenth Amendment). The
same definiteness is not required in a civil statute. Levy Leasing Co. v.
Siegel. 258 U. S. 242. 250 (1922) ; but see Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1924, No. io,
decided March 2, 1925.
The statute in the principal case operated only on those who knowingly
violated its provisions; hence the contention of the appellants was clearly
untenable. Even in the absence of such a requirement, the statute would
probably have been held constitutional. The word "kosher" has a meaning
well enough defined to enable one to apply it correctly. When applied to
meat, it signifies meat from animals slaughtered and cut by an orthodox
Hebrew acting under the authorization of a rabbi, in accordance with orthodox Hebrew religious requirements. The animal at the time of killing must
be sound and healthy, and without broken ribs. It must be killed by cutting in the throat with a knife with a perfectly sharpi edge. Certain blood
vessels must be removed, the meat must be washed, and kept separate from
non-kosher meat. Failure to comply with a single requirement renders the
meat non-kosher. See People v. Atlas, 183 App. Div. 595, 17o N. Y. Supp.
834 (1918).
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Though the requirements are many, they are ordinarily easily understood and applied. Exceptional cases may sometimes arise where even experts
might differ with regard to whether certain meat is kosher;' but a statute otherwise clear is not fatally indefinite because in some instances opinions differ in
respect of what falls within its terms. See Nash v. United States, 229 U. S.
373 (1913) ; Miller v. Strahl, 239 U. S. 426 (I915).
The statute in the present case is another instance of numerous at-

tempts by the state in the exercise of its police powers to prevent deception
upon its people.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-OLD AGE PEN.SIONS-VALIDITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

OLD AGE

AssisTAN.. LAW.-The Old Age Assistance Act of Pennsylvania
provided that the income of persons over seventy years of age, who fulfilled

certain requirements of eligibility, should be made up to one dollar per day
from money appropriated by the state. Act OF MAY io, 1923, P. L. 189.
The plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain the fiscal officers of the state

from paying bills incurred under the law. The injunction was granted and
the law declared unconstitutional. Busser et al. v. Snydcr et al., Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, Feb. 2, 1925. Not yet reported.
The advisability of the court's action from a non-legal standpoint is not
here under consideration. Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, Art. III, Sec.
17, which provides: "No appropriation

.

. . shall be made for charitable,

educational, or benevolent purposes, to any person or community," the decision
is unassailable. It seems clear that an appropriation to a class of persons
is an appropriation "to any person" within the meaning of the Constitution,
and that the intervention of state and county boards for distribution does
not make the gift less direct. Consequently, it seems that the Pennsylvania
Mothers' Assistance Act must also fail on challenge, since it also provides
for state appropriation, through state and county boards, to a class. AcT OF
JULY io, i9i9,

P. L. 893.

Pennsylvania must either abandon such legisla-

tion or erect a new machinery for distribution which will not require appropriation by the state.
Old Age Pension laws are now in force in Alaska, Montana and Nevada.
ALASKA SESSION LAWS 1915;
NEVADA STAT. 96. See io A.

C. 64; z923 LAWS OF MONTANA

192; 1923

B. A. JouR. xog. The Constitutions of Montana and Nevada assign to the counties provision for the poor; MONT. CoNsr.,
Art. X, Sec. 5; NEV. CONsT., Art. 13, Sec. 3; and this has been held to forbid
state relief. Nevada ex ref. Keyser v. Hallock. T4 Nev. 2o2 (3879). So a
similar question of constitutionality may arise in these jurisdictions. The
validity of the Nevada statute may be doubted, since the state shares in the
work and expense of administration. But the Montana law is clearly good
and might well serve as a model to avoid the difficulty now encountered in
Pennsylvania, since the state provides by law only the frhmework of system which the counties administer and support from their own poor funds.
Under such an act no appropriation would be necessary, and no question
under Art. III, Sec. 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution would be raised.
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CRIMINAL

LAW-FORMER

JEOPARDY-SU'B.M!SSION

ON AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS.-The

OF

CASE

TO

CotRT

defendants and others were indicted

for a conspiracy to procure the paving of a certain highway with brick.
The prosecution was begun against all, but it was found that the Statute of
Limitations had run in favor of the third corporation, and by agreement
action was discontinued against the officers of the defendants. The prosecution and the defendants then agreed to submit the case on an agreed statement of facts; some of which the prosecution would have been unable to
prove. This was accepted by the trial court, after joinder of the name of
the other defendant corporation on the record, and the case submitted to the
court, a jury being waived, on plea of not guilty and demurrer to the facts
stated. Thereafter, the court announced its determination to set aside this
agreed statement of facts, on the ground of an erroneous belief that all the
defendants had joined in it. This was done, against the defendants' objection, and a second trial had. Held: That jeopardy had attached upon the submission of the case on the agreed facts, so that the new trial put the defendants in double jeopardy. State v. Pittsburg Paving Brick Co. et al., 230
Pac. xo35 (Kan., 1924).
The case would appear to be one of first impression, but the decision is
certainly correct. The trial had advanced at least to the stage corresponding to the point in a trial by jury where all the evidence is in and the jury
charged with the deliverance of the defendant. Nothing more was to be
done by either party to the litigation, the court having the power forthwith
to pronounce judgment for the state or the defendants, according to its application of the law to the facts of the agreed case. When that stage has been
reached, the defense of double jeopardy can be avoided only by the fact
that the defense appeals or asks to have the verdict set 'aside. Here the
defendants expressly and strongly objected to the setting aside of the agreed
statement of facts, and whether the situation is taken to be as stated by the
court, above, or as analogous rather to the rendition of a special verdict, the
decision is equally sound.
EVIDENcE-CONFESSIoN-DIR.CT OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENcE.-The prisoner, who had killed two persons, made an oral confession which was written
down, signed by him, and attested by four witnesses. Except for the confession the evidence of the killing was circumstantial. Sec. 6665 C. L. 192i
provides that no person "shall suffer the death penalty who shall have been
convicted on circumstantial evidence alone." The prisoner was sentenced to
be executed, and appealed. The court held, overruling a former decision,
that a confession is direct evidence. Mitchell %'.People, 232 Pac. 685 (Colo.
1925).

The Colorado court had held that an e'trajudicial confession, even
orally, was circumstantial evidence, so that after a cwi:iction based on such
confession unaccompanied by direct evidence the death sentence could not be
imposed. Damas v. People, 62 Colo. 418, 163 Pac. 289 (1917). In the instant
case the court expressly overruled Dantas v. People. They declared that a
confession, once established, is direct evidence and that the difficulty is "with
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the facts establishing the confession and not with the facts established by the
confession." If the confession is once established it is the evidence of one who
took cognizance of the facts in issue, not of one who took cognizance of facts
from which those in issue must be deduced.
Authorities are agreed that a confession, once established, is the best
possible evidence but that there are many serious difficulties in the way of
sufficiently establishing an oral extrajudicial confession. I GREENLEAF, EVIDENcE (xith ed.), 215; I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 866. It is generally held that a
confession is direct evidence of guilt, but this rule is usually pronounced by
way of dictum rather than by direct decision. Hart v. State, 14 Ga. App.
714, 82 S. E. 164 (1914); Wilganowski v. State, 76 Tex. Crim. Rep. 328, i8o
S. W. 694 (zgxs) ; State v. Kornstett, 62 Kin. 221, 61 Pac. 8o5 (igoo).
The reasoning of the Damas case seems to show a confusion between
hearsay evidence and circumstantial evidence. Hearsay evidence once brought
within one of the exceptions to the rule for its exclusion may be just as
direct as that given on the stand by an eyewitness if the person who made
the hearsay statement had equal opportunity for observing the facts. Therefore the ruling in the instant case is the one consistent with logic and reason.
INSURANCE-CONSTRUCTIoN-UiGLARY BY FouR ARmED ME HELD A
RioT.-The appellant insured the respondent against loss by burglary. The
policy contained a proviso that the insurance did not cover loss caused directly or indirectly by riot. Four armed men entered the respondent's premises on a summer evening while it was still daylight, held up the employees,
and took a sum of money. This was done so quietly that there was no disturbance in the neighborhood. The respondents sued on the policy and recovered below. The House of Lords reversed the judgment on the ground that
the loss was caused by a riot. London & Lancashire Fire Insurance Co. v.
Bolands, Ltd., [1924] A. C. 836.
While this decision may strike the reader as surprising, it follows logically from two earlier decisions of the House of Lords. In the first of these,
an automobile, insured under a policy excepting losses caused by
riot or civil commotion, was stolen under circumstances which justified a
finding that it had be en taken by insurrectionists in pursuance of their activities. The exception was held to prevent recovery for the loss. Cooper v.
General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., [19-] 2 I. R. 214. In the
second case a car similarly insured was taken from its driver on a highway
by three or four armed men. There was reason to suspect insurrectionists,
but insufficient proof. It was held that there was strictly no civil commotion, but that there was a riot within the legally accepted definition of the
word. Motor Union Insurance Co. v. Boggan, 11923] 2 1. K 136.
All the elements necessary to convict of the crime of riot are present in
the instant case. 9 HALSBU'RY'S L.AWS OF ENGLAND 929; 34 CYc. 1772. The
courts commonly say that there is no distinction in the ordinary use of the
word and its legal use; but in most of the cases there has been a large body
of persons joining in the act and partially paralyzing the governmental functions; Spring Garden Insurance Co. v. Imperial Tobacco Co., 132 Ky. 7;
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116 S. W. 234 (909); Kirsclhcnbaum Co. v. Insurance Co., 107 Neb. 368,
186 N. W. 325 (1922); or else there have been less than three persons involved and so no riot. Phoenix Insurance Co. of Brooklyn v. Jones, 16
Ga. App. 261, 8s S. E. 206 (xixs). In the Spring Gardcn case there is a
dictum which indicates that if the court had been presented with circumstances similar to those of the instant case, it would have reached a different
result.
Ordinarily if the language employed in a policy is that of the insurer
and is susceptible of two meanings, the one most favorable to the insured is
adopted. 14 R. C. L. 931; Insurance Companies v. Wright, 68 U. S. 456
(1863). It would seem that the intent of the parties would have been better served if the court had recognized that the business conception of a
riot is a disturbance of the peace which, for no matter how brief a period,
actually paralyzes the forces of government, and had interpreted the policy
accordingly.
INSURANCE--CONSTRUCTION-INONTESTABILITY

CLAUs.-An insurance pol-

icy issued by the defendant on the life of the plaintiff's husband, contained
the following clause: "This policy shall be incontestable after one year except for nonpayment of premiums." Within the year the insured died and
the defendant refused to pay the claim, on the ground that the policy had
been obtained by false statements as to the health of the insured. In a suit
on the policy, brought by the beneficiary after the stipulated period had run,
the defense of fraud was set up. Held: That such a defense was barred
because there had been no contest within the year. Repala v. J. Hancock Life
Insurance Company, 2oz N. V. 465 (Mich. 1924).
The incontestability clause is now a feature of almost every life insurance policy and its interpretation is, therefore, a matter of paramount importance. It is well settled that such a clause is valid, and that it precludes
the defense of even fraudulent misstatements as to the health of the insured.
Wright v. Mutual Bene. Assoc., z8 N. Y. 237, 23 N. E. 186 (i8go) ; Clement
v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., iot Tenn. 22, 46 S. W. 561 (1898); Life Assoc. v.
Austin, 142 Fed. 398 (C C. A. s9oS). But, as to its application, the courts
have differed. It has been held that in the case where the insured has died
within the stipulated period, such an incontestability clause is inoperative.
Courts so holding rest their decisions on the ground that the rights and liabilities of the parties become fixed by the death, and, since at that time the
defense of fraud is valid, it remains valid ad infinitum. As a result, the
insurer can, in such a case, interpose the defense of fraud in any subsequent
suit on the policy regardless of the incontestability clause. Jefferson Stand.
L. Ins. Co. v. McIntyre, 285 Fed. 570 (D. C. 1922), semble; Mutual L in.,.
Co. of N. Y. v. Stevens, 195 N. W. 913 (Minn. 1923); Markovitl v.Metro.
Ins. Co., 122 Misc. 675, 2o3 N. Y. Supp. 534 (1924). It is submitted that
this is not a reasonable interpretation of the clause. The policy clearly states
that after one year it shall be incontestable, and says nothing about a condition precedent, namely, that the insured should survive the period. It
would, therefore, seem that reading such a condition into the clause is mate-
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rially changing the terms of that clause. The weight of authority is contrary to such a distinction ;and in accord with the principal case. Monahan v.
Metro. L. Ins. Co., 283 11.. 136, i19 N. E. 68 (1918) ; Mutual L. Ils. Co. of
N. Y. v. Hurn i Packing Co., 263 U. S. 167 (1923) ; Feicrinan v. Eureka Ils.
Co., 279 Pa. 507, 124 At. 171 (1924). These cases hold that the incontestability clause is of the nature of, and has the same effect as, a short statute
of limitations against the insurer and therefore inures to the benefit of -the
beneficiary as well as to the insured.
As a result, in most jurisdictions, the insurer must, in every case, contest the policy within the stipulated period or lose the defense. It is generally
held, in accord with the principal case, that mere notice is not equivalent to
a contest on the ground that the word "contest" in its legal sense always"
imports litigation. It is, therefore, necessary for the insurer either to bring
a bill in equity for the cancellation of the contract, or plead it as a defense
to an action on the policy, within the stipulated period. Amer. Tr. Co. v.
Life Ins. Co. of Va., 173 N. C. 558, 92 S. F. 706 (1917) ; Mo. St. L. Ins. Co.
v. Cranford, 16x Ark. 602, 257 S. W. 66 (1923) ; Powell v. Mut. L. Ins. Co.,
144 N. E. 825 (I11. x924). A few cases hold that mere notice of repudiation
with the reasons therefor is a sufficient "contest" within the clause. Feierman
v. Eureka L. Ins. Co., supro; Jefferson Stand. L. Ins. Co. v. McIntyre, supra;
Mut. L. Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Hurni P. Co., supra, semble. But a mere notification per se raises only a question of fact which, without an agreement with
the insured or his beneficiary, cannot be settled except before a legal body
competent to find the fact of whether there was fraud or not. It would,
then, seem only fair that the insurer should take some steps to bring the
matter to a definite conclusion. To force the insurer either to take an
affirmative step in equity to have the policy cancelled, or to plead the misrepresentation as a defense in an action on the policy, within the stipulated
period, seems logically sound and in accord with public policy.
SALES-UNIFORaM SALES AcT-SE TION 4 UNcoNsTITUTIoNAL-Article III,

Section 3, of the Pennsylvania State Constitution provides that "No Bill,
except general appropriation bills, shall be passed containing more than one
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." The Uniform Sales
Act of May 19, 1915, P. L. 543, is entitled "An Act relating to the sale of
goods." Section 4 of that act provides that "A contract to sell or a sale of
any goods or choses in action of the value of $5oo or upwards shall not
be enforceable by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods'...
or give somcthin.g in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment, or unless
some note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the
party to be charged

.

. ."

The plaintiff brought suit for breach of an

oral contract to buy certain shares of corporate stock The .defense was
that the statement of claim did not set forth any of the circumstances neeecessary under the above section. Held: For the plaintiff, since section 4 violates Article III, section j, in so far as it relates to choses in action. Guppy
v. Moltrup, 281 Pa. 343 k.924).
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The purpose of the Constitutional provision is to prevent fraud and deception by giving to parties interested information as to the subject of the
bill through its title. Provident L. & T. Co. v. Hammond, 230 Pa. 407, 79
Atd. 628 (19ii). Having already decided that shares of stock were choses
in action, Peoples Bank v. Kurtz, 99 Pa. 344 (1882), the court argues that,
as a practical matter, the numerous stock brokers and others buying and
selling corporate stock cannot be expected to find these transactions governed by an "Act relating to the sale of goods." Secondly, the statute itself
discloses the ambiguity. Section 76 specifies that "In this Act, unless the
context or subject matter otherwise requires . . . 'goods' include all
chattels personal other than things in action and money." And section 4
relates to "a sale of any goods or choses in action"
It is beyond
argument, therefore, that the one subject of the act is not clearly expressed
in the title. In fact, there is an intimatibn that the whole may be unconstitutional as containing two subjects, but this point is left undecided.
Since this is one of the "uniform" acts, it is interesting to note that the
constitutions of no less than thirty-one other states require that the one
subject of a bill be expressed in its title. Only eight of these other constitutional provisions use the word "clearly," and the decision in the principal
case may be a precedent for these latter states only. See Provident L. &'
T. Co. v. Hammond, 230 Pa. 407, 413, 79 Atl. 628 (i9xg).
TiAL---Vom DiEE EXAMINATION-RIGHT TO QUESTION AS TO SoCAL
AFnLIATioNs.-Indictment of a woman for the illicit sale of liquor. The
trial court would not permit counsel for the defendant to ask talesmen in
their voir dire examination if they belonged to the Ku Klux Klan, there
having been no direct showing of any Klan action in the matter. Held: No
error. People v. Kroll 145 N. E. 814 (11. 1g24).
Most jurisdictions allow the examination of prospective jurors to. go
beyond those points which would justify a challenge for cause and allow
further inquiry in order to bring out information upon which the defendant may base his peremptory challenges. While these questions are not allowed to refer to matters not pertinent to the case, they are, within the discretion of the trial judge, allowed to vary greatly, and to go to any point
which might create a prejudice in the mind of a juror. People v. Reyes, S

Cal. 347 (855);

Lavin v. People, 69 III. 3o3 (1873); Hale v. State, 72

Miss. 140, 16 So. 387 (1894). Cf. 1o9 A. S. R. 563 note.
A prospective juror may be asked the general question whether he belong
to any organization the obligations of which would affect his impartial ver-

dict in the case involved.

Lavin v. People, supra; State v. Mann, 83 Mo.

589 (x884). But it is a matter of some doubt whether, if he answer in the
negative, he may then be asked the specific question, whether he belongs to a
particular organization. If that organization is a party to the case, or if one
of the parties or a prominent witness is a member of it, the question is
permissible. State i). Tiqhe, 27 Mont. 327, 71 Pac. 3 (09o7); State v.
Miller. 207 S. W. 797 (Mo. 1918). It has also been permitted where counsel offered evidence that the organization was taking an active interest in
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the case. Reich v. State, 94 Tex. Cr. R_ 449, 251 S. W. 1072 (923); Bethel
v. State, 162 Ark. 76, 257 S. W. 740 (1924). Where there is no direct showing of any interest on the part of the
organization the cases are not in accord. In Texas, the rule has developed
from a series of cases in which active interest was shown, that the direct
question, "Do you belong to the Ku Klux Klan?" may always be asked.
Belcher v'. State, 96 Tex. Cr. R. 561, 257 S. W. 1097 (19z4); Bennett v.
State, 97 Tex. Cr. R 459, 261 S. W. io36 (i924) ; Moore v. State, 265 S. W.
385 (Tex. Cr. App. 1924). Arkansas permitted this question where the
active interest of the Klan was shown, Bethel v. State, supra, and also where
a union, the strike of which was the basis of the case, wasr shown to have expressed by resolution its opposition to the Klan, Clark v. State, 154 Ark. 59A,
243 S. W. 868 (1922). But in Snyder v. State, i6o Ark. 93, 254 S. V. 381
(923), where a woman was on trial for manslaughter, the court did not
think membership in the Klan could be material, and would not hold as error
the refusal to permit this question. Cf. 31 A. L R. 411, note.
The courts of Oklahoma have come to a conclusion directly opposite to
the holding of the principal case. There a negro was on trial for the theft
of livestock and the Criminal Court of Appeals took judicial notice of the
Klan's opposition to negroes and its pressure for law enforcement, and held
as error the trial court's refusal to permit this question. Johnson v. State, 230
Pac. 525 (Okla. 924). This seems to be a valid extension of the cases holding
that judicial notice may be taken of the fundamental beliefs of the leading
churches; State v. District Board, 76 Wis. 177, 44 N. W. 967 (189o); Hilton
v. Roylanee, 25 Utah 129, 69 Pac. 66o (i9o2) ; and of prejudices against certain races and faiths. Luft v. Lingane, 17 R. I. 420, 22 Ad. 942 (i891) ; Witcher
v. Jones, 43 N. Y. S. R. 151, 17 N. Y. Supp. 491 (1892) : A.xton-Fishe" Co. v.
Post, 169 Ky. 64, 183 S. W. 269 (z916). But cf. Ho.xe v. Pfaelz-er, 167 II1.
App. 79 (1912), where the court refused to notice that counsel could so work
upon an anti-Hebrew prejudice as to obtain an unjust verdict.
If peremptory challenges are to be of any value to a defendant, he ought to
be allowed any reasonable question to enable him to know enough about his
talesmen to decide whom he should challenge. And if recent reports are any
indication of Klan activities on liquor enforcement, the information might be
very important in such a case. It is submitted that the decision in the Oklahoma case is entirely correct and that, assuming the Klan's enforcement movement is general throughout Illinois, that court might have done well to notice
the condition and to permit the question.
TRUSTS-CFArrAia LE TRUSrs-UNcERTArN BFNEFICIARIEs.--The testators
will provided that the residue of his estate should be distributed among such
religious and charitable purposes, objects and institutions as his executors
should appoint, "and as in their judgment are in accord with.my wishes andpreferences." One executor renounced and the other died without having
selected the charitir- i,hch should benefit. The testator's heirs sue for the
estate. Held: That the objects of the trust were cap'able of ascertainment and
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that the court could appoint a trustee who was capable of designating the
beneficiaries. Thompson's Estate, 282 Pa. 30 (1925).
It is a maxim of equity never to allow a certain and valid trust to fail
for want of a trustee. Treat's Appeal, 30 Conn. 113 (i86x), and if a gift was
intended to be upon a trust which another can execute, the courts will usually
appoint a competent trustee. Klunipert v. Vrieland, 142 Iowa 434, x21 N. W.
34 (i909). In such cases, the courts say that there is no ground to suppose
that the discretion of any particular trustee is material to the essence of the
gift. But if it is the evident intention of the testator that the power given to
the trustee is a personal trust and confidence, the court should not apipoint
other trustees to exercise that power contrary to the intention of the testator.
PERRY, TausTs (6th ed. x9ii), sec. 731. However, as is evidenced in the instant case, there is a strong tendency on the part of the courts to act upon
liberal principles of construction in order to uphold the trust. See 72 U. or
PA. L. REV. 45'.
The question, then, is whether uncertainty of the objects to be benefited
will render a charitable trust ineffective. There is much conflict of authority
as to what is sufficient definiteness as to beneficiaries and the rule varies
throughout the country between the rule for private trusts, which require a
definite beneficiary, Trinity M. E. Church v. Baker, 91 Md. 539, 46 At.
io2o (zgoo), and the rule established in England that courts of equity have
inherent jurisdiction to provide for the proper execution of charitable trusts
in all cases where the intent of the donor to devote the property to some
form of charity is clear. Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 82 N. W. 345
(igoo); Kasey v. Fidelity Trust Co., 131 Ky. 6og, 115 S. W. 739 (xgo9).
Some jurisdictions require a certain and definite class of persons from which
the beneficiaries must be selected, Strong's Appeal, 68 Conn. 527, 37 At. 39S
(1897), but the tendency of the majority is to uphold the trust even when
the donor has not specified the particular charitable use, but has merely limited it to such objects of charity as the trustee may select. Ketmerer v.
Kemmerer, 233 II1. 327, 84 N. F_ 256 (igo). Massachusetts apparently has
gone beyond the limits set by other American jurisdictions. Where it is
clear that the testator intended to make a gift for charitable purposes, the
court will supply a trustee and a scheme by which the beneficiaries may be
selected. Minof v. Baker, 147 Mass. 348, 17 N. E. 839 (i888). In Pennsylvania, it is provided by the Act of April 26, 1855, P. L 328, the provisions
of which were substantially re-enacted by the Act of May 23, 1895, P. L.
114, that a charitable trust shall not fail for want of a trustee, or by
reason of the object's being indefinite or uncertain, but that the Orphans'
Court shall carry into effect the intent of the testator, so far as it can
be ascertained. DeSilver's Estate, 211 Pa. 459, 6o At. xo48 (z9o5).
The instant case is in line with the trend of decisions effectuating the
intent of the testator to make a charitable bequest, but, it is submitted that
it goes further than any Pennsylvania court has heretofore gone, in that it
supplies a trustee, not merely to execute the trust, but also to determine who
shall be its beneficiaries.
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VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIOxs-RIGHT To ExrF_. MEMBERS-NEW YORK STOCK

ExcIIA.c.E.-The plaintiff was a member of the New York Stock Exchange,
a voluntary association organized for the mutual conveniences and advantage
of its members. The association was governed by a constitution and by-laws
which defined the duties and rights of the members. The plaintiff was
charged with "rigging the market," an act prohibited by the association. He
was tried by an authorized body of the exchange and he produced evidence
in his defense. lie was found guilty of the offense and expelled from
membership. The plaintiff asked the court for an injunction to restrain the
expulsion on the ground that the evidence adduced did not amount to legal
proof. Held: That the court would not interfere where the association acted
in accordance with its rules, and where its action is reasonable. Miller v.
Simons, as President of the New York Stock Exchange, et a[., N. Y. Sup.
Ct, Special Term, Part One, N. Y. County, February 4, 1925. • Not yet reported.
The instant case is another assertion by a court that it will permit a selfgoverning association to make and enforce its own rules for securing fair
conduct by its members. Such associations have been looked on with favor
by the courts. Dillard v. Paton, i9 Fed. 61g (1884); Moffatt v. Board bO
Trade of Kansas City, Iii S. W. 894 (Mo. App. i9o8). They may be regulated by the state under the police power, House v. Mayes, 219 U S: 0
(igi) ; but in the absence of state regulation they may make any reasonable
rules for their own members. People v. New York Produce Exchange, 149
N. Y. 4o, 44 N. E. 84 (896); People v. Chicago Board of Trade, 224
IIl. 370, 79 N. E. 6xx (ixo6). These rules are not binding on a court in its
adjudication of a dispute between members and the association, Wett End
Dry Goods Store v. Maun, 333 Ill. App. 544 (i9o8); but the courts are unwilling to interfere in these disputes and will treat the rules of the association as binding on the members, Thompson v. Adams, 93 Pa. 55 (1884);"
Belton v. Hatch, iog N. Y. 593, 17 N. E. 225 (1888); People v. Chicago
Board of Trade, supra, unless such rules are contrary to law; People v.
Manufacturers Protective Ass'n, 54 Misc. 332, zo4 N. Y. Supp. (igo7); or
unless the association has acted fraudulently in applying its rules. State v.
Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce, 47 Wis. 67o (1879).
It is submitted that the instant case is correct and shows a sound policy.
Wi.Lrs-GiFns To CHARrT-EFrCr OF CODICIL REDUCING AmouNT.-By a
codicil to a will the testator reduced in amount a bequest to a charitable institution. By Section 6 of the Pa. Wills Act of 1917 (P. L. 403, 4o6)
gifts by will to charitable and religious institutions are void if the will is
executed within thirty days of the death of the testator. This testator died
within thirty days of the execution of the codicil. Held: That the gift was
valid. In re Binaanwn's Estate. 281 Pa. 497, 127 AtL 73 (924).
The prohibition of bequests and devises for charitable and religious uses
'made within a fixed period before the death of the testator exists in several
states, notably New York, California, Georgia. and Pennsylvania, in the last of
which it has been a feature of the law of decedents' estates since 1855. It
:'as bccn suggested that the public policy back of this prohibition was to pre-
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vent importunities by interested charities during the testator's last illness.
HI-ollis v. Diew Theological Seminary, 95 N. Y. i66, 172 (1884). The Commissioners who drew the Pennsylvania Wills Act of 1917 doubted the wisdom
of the provision, but did not suggest its abolition. See Report of Commission
to Codify the Law of Decedents' Estates, 62. Outside of Pennsylvania, the
question of the validity of the reduction of the bequest by a codicil executed
within the period has not arisen. But in New York an increase of the bequest under such circumstances was held invalid, on the ground the testator
had annulled the provisions of his will and substituted others. Canfield v.
Crandall, 4 Dem. Surr. ini (N. Y. 1885). But when the codicil makes no
change in the charitable disposition made in the will, it is valid. In re Farnere
Loan and Trust Co., 138 N. Y. App. Div. 121, 122 N. Y. Supp. 956 (19o);
affirmcd in 199 N. Y. 569, 93 N. E. 11i2o. Accord, Estate of McCauley, 138
CaL 432, 71 Pac. 512 (1903). In Pennsylvania the well-settled interpretation
of similar provisions of previous acts was to the effect that a gift to a religious or charitable use, created by a will executed prior to the fixed period,
will not be defeated by a codicil that simply diminishes the amount of the gift
or postpones the time fixed for its enjoyment, although the latter instrument
is executed within one month of the death. Carl's Appeal, 106 Pa. 635 (1884) ;
In re Morrow, 204 Pa. 484, 54 At. 342 (19o3). The principal case is the first
construction of this provision of the Wills Act of I917. This differed from
that of the previous acts only.in the period of time fixed, which was changed
from one month to thirty days; and the court felt that as this was not a substantial difference, the construction must be the same. Undoubtedly, since the
legislature had the opportunity to make a change and failed to do so, the
decision in the instant case is correct from the standpoint of stare decisis. It
is doubtful, however, whether the Pennsylvania doctrine is legally sound. When
the testator diminishes his bequest, he performs two distinctly different legal
operations: one is an annullment, the other is the making, of a bequest; and
this latter operation dearly comes within the statute. Hence it would seem
that the theory of Canfield v. Crandall,jupra, is sound, and is applicable alike
to increase and decrease of bequests. It is true, however, that the Pennsylvania doctrine does not conflict with the public policy of the provision as
suggested in Hollis v. Drew Theological Seminary, supra, and aside from a
violation of legal reasoning, it leads to a just result; and it undoubtedly carties out the testator's intention. But an increase of the bequest is certainly
contrary to the theory of the prohibition, namely, to prevent importunities;
and it will be interesting to note how the Pennsylvania courts will rule on the
question. From any point of view an increase would seem to be invalid.
WuLis-PowEi

o

APPO11T-ELEcTION

op

WiDow

To TAKE AGAINST

WiU.-The testator's father left to him half of his estate, for life, with remainder in trust for such persons as the testator should by will appoint, and
with remainder over. The testator provided that his will was to dispose of
this property over which he had the power of appointment as well as his
own, and without further reference to the power gave certain legacies and,
as the will stood at the time of his death, gave to his wife only the residue,
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which was comparatively small. She elected to take against the will, and
claimed her statutory allowance out of the combined estates which her husband
had owned and over which he had exercised the power. Held: That she was
entitled to a share only of the property which her husband had owned at the
instant of his death. Kates' Estate, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, January
Term, g125, No. 24.
This exact situation has apparently never before arisen in an American
jurisdiction, the most closely analogous case being that in which the 'will
directs conversion of realty into personalty, and the widow electing against
the will seeks to take advantage of this provision. In such a case the very
general view is that she cannot derive this advantage from the will which
she has repudiated; Hoover v. Landis, 76 Pa. 354 (1874); Cunningham's
Estate, x37 Pa. 621, 20 Atl. 714 (89o); Geiger v. Bitzer, 8o Ohio 65, 88 N. F.
134 (i9o9), and with note in 22 L R. A. [N. S.] 285. This depends upon
the rather instinctive feeling of the courts, which is no doubt correct, that
when a wife elects to take against her husband's will she must give up all
advantage of whatsoever kind, accruing therefrom; Pearson v. Darrngton,
32 Ala. 227 (858) ; Ashelford v. Chapman, 8I Kan. 312, io$ Pac. 534 (19o9);
40 Cyc. 1959.
In view of this general trend, the interpretation of the statute in the
principal case (Wills Act of 1917, Sec. 23 (a), P. L 410: "When any person
shall die testate, leaving a surviving spouse who shall elect to take against the
will, such surviving spouse shall be entitled to such interests in the real and
personal estate of the deceased spouse as he or she would have been entitled
to had the testator died intestate") is the only logical one, although the words
of the statute themselves are quite as susceptible of the construction placed
upon them by the court below, in s Pa. D. & C. 570, which said: "The estate
of this testator must be distributed, so far as his widow's rights are concerned,
as though he had died intestate, but to determine what that estate is, resort
2nust be had to the will, and inasmuch as, by that instrument, he made the
trust fund a part of his own estate, his widow is entitled to her share therein."
But Cunningham's Estate, supra, was decided under the practically identical
wording of the Act of 1869, Sec. i, P. L. 77, and by the established rule of
construction of statutes the result reached in the principal case was a necessary conclusion as to the intent of the legislature in passing the present Wills
Act. It had been decided, also, that the election of a widow relates back to
the time of her husband's death; Fitzgibbons's Estate, 2-76 Pa. 105, rig AtL
837 (1923); and this tends to the same conclusion, because it shows that
her rights are fixed at the date of the death, and are not determined by the
will
It is submitted, therefore, that the decision of the principal case is correct in theory, and a logical development of the line of Pennsylvania cases to
some of which reference has been made above, and which are dealt with
at length in the opinion of the principal case.

